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THE REGULATION OF COAL SURFACE MINING
IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM*
TERRY D. EDGMON** and DONALD C. MENZEL***
INTRODUCTION
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA)
represents a federal legislative effort to balance the need to increase
coal production to meet the nation's energy requirements with the
safeguarding of the environment for future generations. In the past,
surface mining of coal has led to significant disruptions in traditional
land uses and environmental damage on a large scale.2 Prior to this
act, regulation of surface mining and reclamation practices was the
responsibility of state governments, resulting in a mosaic of diverse
standards and, oftentimes, timidity in enforcement.' With the enact-
ment of SMCRA, however, a uniform regulatory framework has been
established for controlling the adverse effects of surface mining while
enabling coal mine operators to pass on the costs of environmental
protection to those who consume the coal without the fear of being
undercut in the marketplace by others who are less willing to under-
take costly reclamation practices, or who operate in states with mini-
mal reclamation standards. The SMCRA is designed to surmount a
fundamental problem in a federal system of government, namely,
controlling the negative impacts of unconstrained economic competi-
tion among firms operating in states having varying regulatory stan-
dards and patterns of enforcement. 4 As with other federal environ-
mental policies, however, the application of surface mining and
*This research was supported in part by grants from the West Virginia Department of
Natural Resources and the Ford Foundation (Grant #785-0149). The views expressed in the
paper are the authors' alone and are not necessarily shared by the funding agencies.
**Department of Political Science, North Carolina State University.
***Policy Analysis Group, Department of Political Science, West Virginia University.
1. 30 U.S.C. § § 1201-1308 (Supp. III 1979).
2. The literature is extensive. See generally COAL AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE (A. Yanarella ed. 1979).
3. See E. IMHOFF, T. FRIZ & J. LAFEVERS, A GUIDE TO STATE PROGRAMS FOR
THE RECLAMATION OF SURFACE MINED AREA (1976); M. LANDY, THE POLITICS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM: CONTROLLING KENTUCKY STRIP MINING (1976);
R. NEHRING & B. ZYCHER, COAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTHERN GREAT
PLAINS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1976); W. ROSENBAUM, COAL AND THE CRISIS:
THE POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF ENERGY MANAGEMENT (1978).
4. Battle, Transportation Controls under the aean Air Act-An Experience in (un) Co-
operative Federalism, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1980).
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reclamation standards to insure equity in the distribution of costs
and benefits in resource extraction is a difficult task at best. The
wide diversity in environmental conditions under which surface min-
ing takes place and the variability in public attitudes reflected by
state governmental policies make implementation difficult.
Critical to the implementation of a set of national surface mining
and reclamation standards is the development of a federal regulatory
strategy. Such a strategy will, on one hand, insure equity in the appli-
cation of national standards and, on the other, allow some measure
of flexibility in the determination of management practices which
are best suited for site-specific problems encountered within an eco-
logically and geologically diverse environment. Congress, in its experi-
ence with the development of national standards for air and water
pollution, devised a mechanism it hoped would be able to achieve
equity in the application of national standards. The provisions of
SMCRA are based upon the now familiar principle of cooperative
federalism, whereby states are offered both positive and negative in-
ducements to assume important roles in the design and implementa-
tion of regulatory programs that are consistent with the goals of the
act. However, with the creation of the Office of Surface Mining
(OSM)5 in the Department of the Interior, an ever-widening contro-
versy over state-federal roles and relationships has caught this newly
created federal agency in a political-bureaucratic struggle over who
shall determine the appropriate balance between diverse subnational
interests and the necessity for uniform standards for surface mining
and reclamation. The eventual outcome of this struggle is critical, be-
cause it will largely determine the ultimate effectiveness of the act to
serve as a policy tool for sustaining needed coal production while
protecting the environment. In a larger sense, the implementation of
the act itself is a test of the principle of cooperative federalism as a
mechanism for insuring equity in the administration of national stan-
dards and, simultaneously, allowing for a measure of state diversity.
The purpose of this article is to examine the dynamics of intergov-
ernmental politics associated with the implementation of the federal
program for regulating the surface mining of coal in the United
States. This is accomplished by defining SMCRA in relation to other
federal environmental legislation and developing a conceptual frame-
work for the analysis of state-federal relationships which have been
established by the regulatory mechanism embodied in the act. This
analysis reaches the conclusion that the effectiveness of the principle
of cooperative federalism as a policy management tool is conditioned
5. 30 U.S.C. § 1211 (Supp. 1II 1979).
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by the particular implementation strategy adopted by the agency
(OSM) authorized to develop and enforce the provisions of the legis-
lation, and the relationships developed between it and state agency
counterparts. The manner in which the agency defines key provisions
of the act and the style used to provide incentives and invoke sanc-
tions are critical to the evolution of a genuine partnership between
state and federal units of government.
THE COAL ACT OF 1977
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 emerged
at a period in the environmental movement of the 1970s when public
concern for environmental quality had begun to give way to the mal-
aise of an enduring energy crisis and increasing disenchantment with
federal regulatory policies. However, during this decade, the ramifica-
tions of the rapid growth of coal surface mining caused misgivings. In
1970, surface mining accounted for only 44 percent of all coal pro-
duced in this country. By 1974, however, the level had risen to 54
percent.6 In the western U.S., surface coal production grew rapidly
in mid-1970, and it is estimated to increase from 73 million tons in
1974 to 574 million tons by the year 2000.' This growth represents
nearly an eightfold increase in coal production and requires substan-
tial areas of land. With this real and projected expansion in the mid-
western and Rocky Mountain states, sufficient support was generated
for the passage of two bills by Congress in 19748 and 1975.1 They
were vetoed by President Gerald R. Ford on the grounds that such
legislation would be inflationary. Finally, in 1977, a bill was passed
with the blessing of the new President, Jimmy Carter, who urged the
Congress to adopt "the strictest reclamation standards possible."' 0
The act itself is an omnibus piece of legislation similar in structure
to the Clean Air Act'' and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments' 2 passed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Its organiz-
ing principle is that of cooperative federalism, whereby a state-federal
partnership is established in the implementation process through the
application of a mix of carrots and sticks to induce states to imple-
6. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. COAL DEVELOPMENT-PROMISES
AND UNCERTAINTIES, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 4-15 (1977).
7. Id.
8. S. 425, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 40054 (1974).
9. H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 13385-86 (1975).
10. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 275 (1977).
11. 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7642 (Supp. 111978).
12. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
861-902 (amending 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (1970)).
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ment federal objectives. The significant goals of SMCRA as estab-
lished in Section 102 are
(i) establish a nationwide program to protect society and the envi-
ronment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations;
(ii) promote the reclamation of mined areas left without adequate
reclamation prior to [1977] ... which continue, in their unreclaimed
condition, to substantially degrade the quality of the environment
... or endanger the health or safety of the public; and (iii) strike a
balance between the protection of the environment . . . and the
Nation's need for coal as an essential source of energy. 
13
As in the case of national air and water legislation, the above stated
goals are to be attained through an elaborate system of incentives and
regulatory sanctions. A major inducement for the states to develop
regulatory programs is the establishment of a multi-million dollar
trust fund in the Department of the Treasury." These monies will
be expended for the reclamation and restoration of land and water
resources adversely affected by past coal mining. Revenues for the
trust fund are derived from a reclamation fee of 350 per ton of coal
produced by surface mining and 150 per ton of coal that is deep
mined.' I Fifty percent of all funds generated in a particular state
must be expended in that state. 1 6 In addition, OSM is authorized to
provide grants to states to enable them to establish regulatory pro-
grams and develop university based mining and engineering research
and training programs. 1 7
The regulatory components of the act, on its face, assign primary
responsibility for regulating the adverse impacts of surface distur-
bances to the states. Section 101(f) says, "the primary governmental
responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing reg-
ulations for surface mining and reclamation operations. . should
rest with the States.' 8 Reinforcing this section is the "state win-
dow" provision that OSM established in the permanent regulations.1 9
It provides for the development of mining and reclamation standards
that meet particular climatic, geographic, or biological conditions
peculiar to specific coal regions found among the states. As explained
by the director of OSM, the various states "can set forth alternatives
13. 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. 11 1979).
14. Id. § 1231.
15. Id. § 1232.
16. Id. § 1232(g)(2).
17. Id. §§ 1221-1229.
18. Id. § 1201(0.
19. 30C.F.R. § 731.13 (1979).
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that are necessary in their view to identify the peculiarities of their
regions and design their programs accordingly." ' '2 0
The states, however, do not have to implement a federal regulatory
program; but if they do not establish satisfactory programs OSM must
do so.2 In principle, OSM is to work with and through the states to
the fullest extent possible in developing state programs that, collec-
tively, constitute a national regulatory program.
The act also calls for the establishment of regulatory programs on
federal lands.2 2 Prior to the passage of the act, surface mining regula-
tion was achieved through formal cooperative agreements established
between the respective states and the Department of Interior. Six
states-Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming-had such agreements prior to 1977. These agreements
created regulations and standards for state enforcement on both state
and federal lands. States with cooperative agreements in existence at
the time of passage of the act, and whose programs are approved by
OSM, can continue to regulate coal operations on federal lands, pro-
vided the existing cooperative agreement is brought into compliance
with the act.2  Section 523 stipulates however, that the Secretary of
Interior may not delegate to the states his duty to approve mining
plans on federal lands.
Regardless of whether OSM or the states implement a regulatory
program, compliance with national performance standards is based
upon the comparison of the plan with a set of performance and de-
sign criteria to mine and reclaim the land. If the plan satisfies the cri-
teria, then the operator is granted a permit to operate. If the opera-
tor, upon inspection of an operation, is found to be in violation of
the plan (hence, the standards), then a range of civil and criminal
sanctions can be invoked .2 4 In addition, as with other national envi-
ronmental legislation, the act provides for citizens with standing to
bring suit as a means to insure federal enforcement of the regula-
tions.
2 5
20. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS & RESOURCES, COMM. ON ENERGY
& NATURAL RESOURCES, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., OVERSIGHT HEARINGS ON IMPLE-
MENTATION OF SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT 4 (Comm.
Print 1978) (hereinafter cited as 1978 OVERSIGHT HEARINGS].
21. 30 U.S.C. § 1254 (Supp. I11 1979).
22. Id. § 1273.
23. 30 C.F.R. § 745 (1979).
24. 30 U.S.C. § 1268 (Supp. III 1979). The OSM devised a complex point system for
awarding civil penalties that has, in some instances, made it more atrractive for operators to
go out of business rather than reclaim land. This paradoxical situation has caused the OSM
to revise its civil penalty scheme, thereby making it less onerous to operators. For specific
details, see 44 Fed. Reg. 58,780-86 (1980).
25. 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Supp. III 1979).
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Comparisons With Air and Water Pollution Policies
While the legal framework of the coal act is similar to other federal
environmental legislation, the conditions under which it has been im-
plemented differ significantly. First, the Clean Air Act2 6 and the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197227 (and later the
Clean Water Act of 1977)28 were manifestations of a gradual shift of
regulatory authority from the states to the federal government,
whereas the SMCRA does the reverse. The Water Pollution Control
Act of 1948,29 while granting the federal government authority to
investigate, research, and survey, left primary responsibilities for pol-
lution control with the states. Although amendments of 1956 intro-
duced a complex procedure for federal enforcement actions, they
served primarily as a vehicle for providing water treatment plant con-
struction grants.3 * A national permit system (NPDES) was not
authorized until 1972 31 and is still not fully implemented in all 50
states. The first legislation which authorized federal activity in air
pollution control was passed in 1955, 3 2 and the history of federal in-
volvement over the 15-year period to the passage of the Clean Air
Act follows a similar evolutionary path. The SMCRA, however, had
no such legislative history. Created full blown in 1977, the act created
comprehensive authority for federal activity in an area traditionally
dominated by the states.
Second, over the years some coal producing states had developed
administrative machinery for, and expertise in, regulating surfacing
mining and reclamation practices. Although the record for strict en-
forcement in the states has been mixed, many states nevertheless
have had ongoing programs administered by personnel who have
come to terms with the realities of state politics and the necessity for
surface mining regulation. 3
In sum, SMCRA can be seen as a federal action to establish national
26. 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7642 (Supp. 111978).
27. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (amending 33 U.S.C. § § 1251-1376 (1970)).
28. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (amending 33 U.S.C.
§ § 1251-1281 (1976)).
29. Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ § 1251-1376 (1976)).
30. See Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498.
31. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 880 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976)) (amended
1977).
32. Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322.
33. See M. LANDY, supra note 3. See also SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY & NATURAL
RESOURCES, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., STATE SURFACE MINING LAWS: A SURVEY, A
COMPARISON WITH PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION, AND BACKGROUND IN-
FORMATION (Comm. Print 1977).
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standards for environmental protection on the basis of a federal-state
partnership. As such, the act contains positive and negative induce-
ments for states to develop and implement regulatory programs to
meet national goals. The conditions under which the act has been im-
plemented, however, differ from previous experiences with this form
of cooperative federalism in that the federal government did not have
the opportunity gradually to develop expertise in surface mining reg-
ulation, and has had to confront experienced state agencies which
have been accustomed to a dominant regulatory role, on federal as
well as on state lands.
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES
To assess the implementation strategy of the Office of Surface
Mining, one can draw upon a set of concepts to structure the analysis.
While the process of policy implementation has only recently caught
the attention of scholars, and much is still to be learned, several im-
portant factors have been determined to be significant in shaping
implementation outcomes.3 4 First, it is widely accepted that an
agency may choose a specific implementation strategy from a range
of alternatives. The choice of which strategy to adopt is largely deter-
mined by the resources available to the agency, past experience with
similar policies, the level of knowledge concerning the problems to
be solved or managed, and the perceived political feasibility of
selected alternatives. Second, there exist several imperatives which, if
satisfied, enhance the probabilities of effective implementation a.3 1
Third, every agency is faced with specific constraints to effective im-
plementation, either in statutory requirements or the bureaucratic
milieu in which it operates. Constraints are defined as those factors
which influence the agency's behavior, but over which the agency has
little control or cannot avoid.
Strategies
Perhaps the most critical decision to be made by an agency is the
selection of an implementation strategy. In the area of regulatory
policy, at least three basic strategies can be identified. They are ad-
34. See R. MAKARAMA & F. SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POLICY IMPLE-
MENTATION (1980); Berman, Thinking About Programmed and Adaptive Implementation,
in WHY POLICIES SUCCEED OR FAIL 205 (H. Ingram & D. Mann eds. 1980); Sabatier &
Mazmanian, The Conditions of Effective Implementation, 5 POLICY ANALYSIS 481
(1979).
35. Effective implementation is defined as the extent to which a policy's goals and ob-
jectives are met in practice.
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ministrative, organizational environmental, and learning system strat-
egies.31 6 These strategies are distinguished from each other by the
type of regulatory mechanisms created by the statute and agency in-
terpretation through its rule making function, the mix of incentives
and sanctions employed to induce a change in the behavior of the
groups to be regulated, and the tactics the agency employs to achieve
acceptance of new programs by the states. For example, an adminis-
trative strategy is usually employed in situations where a high consen-
sus on regulatory goals exists and the specific behaviors and technol-
ogies to attain them are known. Enforcement and compliance become
technical matters and, to a large extent, formal regulatory procedures
are utilized to preserve widely accepted social and political values.
For situations where the desired behaviors are not well known and
appropriate behaviors may vary from situation to situation, an orga-
nizational environmental strategy is deemed appropriate. This strategy
allows for negotiation, bargaining, and compromise between the im-
plementing agency and those who must adopt new behaviors. This
strategy is characterized as a mix of positive inducements and nega-
tive sanctions which modify the decision environment of the regu-
lated group.
The third strategy, a learning system approach, is the most decen-
tralized and least coercive of the three strategies. It is employed in
situations where desirable behaviors of the organizations to be regu-
lated are not well known, and moreover, may vary from situation to
situation. In this case, no negative sanctions are employed. Rather,
the implementing agency merely plays a facilitating role and provides
encouragement.
Implementation Imperatives
Given the specific implementation strategy selected by the agency
and its legislative sponsors, certain imperatives must be satisfied if
the regulatory program is to be effective in meeting the goals em-
bodied in the legislation. The first imperative is the statutory require-
ment of the act itself. Sabatier and Mazmanian' I contend that this
imperative is perhaps the most important factor which influences the
implementation process. The statute "structures" the implementation
process by
36. Kirlin, Structuring the Intergovernmental System: An Appraisal of Conceptual
Models and Public Policies (paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, New York, N.Y., September 1-4, 1978).
37. Sabatier & Mazmanian, Toward a More Adequate Conceptualization of the Imple-
mentation Process-With Special Reference to Regulatory Policy (1978) (report by the Insti-
tute of Governmental Affairs, University of California at Davis).
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its selection of the implementing institutions through providing legal
and financial resources... ; through biasing the probable policy
orientations of energy officials; and through regulation the opportu-
nities for participation .... 38
More importantly, the statute determines the agency's mission, that
is, its program objectives, and provides a guide for the achievement
of those objectives. Another important element is the legislated time-
table for implementation milestones.
The second imperative is the establishment by the agency of repu-
tational authority in enforcing its regulations. As Ball noted in the
implementation of water pollution control programs, 3 9 regulatory
compliance will be achieved only if the regulated groups perceive
that the agency possesses the will, technical capability, and political
support to make enforcement sanctions stick. In a word, a successful
regulatory policy operates on the basis of deterrence. The irony is
that voluntary compliance will be achieved only if the regulating
agency is perceived to possess the capability to force compliance.
The third imperative is political support. This is particularly crucial
for regulatory programs which are intergovernmental in nature. As
Thomas4" has pointed out, even if a federal agency has the authority
to implement a program in a state which refuses to develop one itself,
it is loathe to do so. To a certain extent, the federal agency is depen-
dent upon state agencies to implement significant portions of the
statute. State agency support for the policy's objectives, therefore, is
deemed essential if implementation is to be effective.
Constraints
Given the above identified imperatives, several constraints can be
identified. First, regulatory policies which define implementation
roles for state agencies imply that a built in conflict situation may
exist. If the statute contains objectives not deemed relevant to state
agencies and defines procedures with which they are unfamiliar, then
resistance to these necessary changes can be anticipated. At the same
time, however, the federal agency may need to establish its reputa-
tional authority in respect to its policy. The agency, therefore, is
caught in a dilemma. In order to establish reputational authority, it
must take a coercive approach to enforcing regulations. At the same
38. Id. at 11.
39. Ball, Water Pollution and Compliance Decision Making, in PUBLIC POLICY
MAKING IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 169 (C. Jones & R. Thomas eds. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as PUBLIC POLICY MAKING].
40 Thomas, Intergovernmental Coordination in the Implementation of National Air and
Water Pollution Control Policies, in PUBLIC POLICY MAKING, supra note 39, at 129.
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time, it may need to be flexible in its dealings with state agencies.
The paradox is that, in intergovernmental regulatory policies, the
federal agency must first influence the behavior of state or local
agencies before it can be assured that state enforcement programs
will be effective in modifying the behavior of target groups. As Bar-
dach4 1 has observed, massive resistance to legislated changes in the
procedures of subordinate agencies may seriously impede implemen-
tation. Thus, the federal agency must somehow maintain state agency
support for the policy's goals, while at the same time induce them to
alter established regulatory practices and organizational routines.
The second major constraint to implementing an intergovernmental
regulatory policy is related to difficulties inherent in the performance
standards-enforcement approach itself. This approach has been criti-
cized by economists as being cumbersome and inefficient.' 2 With re-
spect to surface mining regulation the problem concerns which ad-
ministrators will be allowed the greatest amount of discretion in
enforcement, state or federal? In order to reduce the level of uncer-
tainty related to implementing the policy, the federal agency will act
to minimize the discretion delegated to field and state agencies. How-
ever, state agencies will press to maximize the amount of discretion
available to them within the context of the statute. This competition
for maximizing decisional discretion is at the heart of intergovern-
mental conflicts in the implementation of intergovernmental regula-
tory programs, since the outcomes will largely determine to whom the
target groups will have to appeal in respect to enforcement decisions.
Taking these constraints together, it comes as no surprise to con-
clude that an administrative strategy has limited application, and that
implementation'outcomes are largely negotiated among the partici-
pants. Therefore, it is usually on the basis of negotiation and com-
promise that an implementing agency finally comes to terms with its
subordinate agencies.
OSM'S IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
Given the concepts defined above, the Office of Surface Mining,
under the direction of Walter Hein, had to accomplish a number of
difficult objectives during the congressionally mandated interim
phase of federal program development. This phase, which has lasted
roughly three years from the time the act was passed, has been im-
41. E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977).
42. See, e.g., A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1975); Majone, Choice Among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control, 2 POL-
ICY ANALYSIS 589 (1976).
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portant for OSM, because within it 4 permanent regulations have
been promulgated, state program grants have been issued, and federal
presence has been felt in coal fields.4 4 With respect to state-federal
relations, activity in this period has been especially critical because it
will greatly influence the administration of the permanent regulatory
program by the states and OSM.
OSM's actions and states' responses have deviated from earlier
environmental policy implementation efforts in a number of ways.
First, strict enforcement actions occurred almost immediately upon
the organization of the agency, often without the benefit of state
agency support for such actions. (In water pollution regulation the
federal EPA has generally followed a policy of selective enforcement
and, to a large extent, has acted in concert with state agencies desiring
an enforcement action but feeling a lack of sufficient political sup-
port on the state level.4 5) Second, OSM developed what many state
officials perceived to be a narrow interpretation of the act, especially
of those portions which defined key state-federal responsibilities.
Third, OSM has been accused of producing long and detailed regula-
tions for permit applications and approvals. Fourth, it attempted to
utilize its grant program to "coerce" the states into accepting its in-
terpretation of the act in the formulation of state programs.
These assertions, if valid, indicate that OSM's implementation
strategy was based on the assumption that not only did a consensus
exist among OSM, the states, and coal firms on the goals of the act,
but also that all parties were in agreement on the specific administra-
tive procedures to be utilized. That is, OSM chose to implement a
predominantly administrative regulatory strategy rather than a more
flexible organizational environmental strategy more common to
other federal environmental management programs.
Strict Enforcement
If the perception of agency willingness and capability to enforce
regulations was an important factor in OSM's strategy to insure regu-
latory compliance, then OSM did not want to leave any doubt about
this fact in the minds of coal operators. While some environmental-
43. The initial timetable called for the OSM to approve or disapprove a state's program
by August 3, 1979. However, due to court actions and legal opinions within the Department
of Interior, this date was changed to January 3, 1981.
44. Federal inspectors did not get into the coal fields until April 1978.
45. For a thorough discussion of EPA's initial strategy, see J. QUARLES, CLEANING




ists4 6 have voiced criticism that OSM has been timid in enforcing
provisions of the act, the record indicates that in 1979 the agency
levied $7.8 million in fines, conducted 20,306 inspections, wrote
4,461 notices of violations, and shut down 998 operations. 4 ' (See
Table 1 for federal enforcement activities in specific states.) These
enforcement actions have led some to voice the opinion that "federal
enforcement policy ... has resulted in a contest between federal re-
gions to see which region can write the most violations and assess the
largest amounts of fines. ' 4 8 Agency officials have countered that
"inspectors do not write tickets unless there are significant viola-
tions."
4
This strategy of strict enforcement, while necessary to develop
reputational authority for the regulating agency, has contributed to
the erosion of state support of SMCRA and OSM. Part of this loss of
support lies in the penalty point system utilized by OSM with which
many state administrators were unfamiliar, and part lies in the differ-
ences in enforcement philosophies between OSM and the states. In
some states, reclamation officials have played a facilitative role in the
enforcement of surface mining regulations. In other states, uses of
negative sanctions, such as civil penalties and shutdown, have been
reserved as "big sticks" to be applied only when other actions have
failed." 0OSM, on the other hand, has elected to "go by the book"
and "take enforcement action whenever a violation is found." ' 1 This
attitude has in effect resulted in a dual enforcement system during
the interim period, a situation which some state officials feel has
undermined state actions.
Narrow Interpretation
The second component of OSM's implementation strategy has
been to interpret SMCRA conservatively in defining federal-state
46. Similar criticism has been offered by former OSM inspectors. See N.Y. Times, Sept.
2, 1980, § A, at 22, col. 3.
47. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, undated
mimeograph.
48. SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
OVERSIGHT HEARINGS-THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION
ACT OF 1977, at 78 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 OVERSIGHT HEAR-
INGS].
49. Donald Crane, as quoted in The Steamboat Pilot, Oct. 18, 1979 (Steamboat Springs,
Colorado).
50. Menzel, Implementation of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (paper presented to the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Asso-
ciation, Gatlinburg, Tenn., Nov. 1-4, 1979).
51. Barry, State-Federal Agreements, Programs, and Issues under the Surface Mining
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relations. Perhaps the most controversial interpretation was OSM's
definition of the state window concept in its final regulations.' 2
Congress, realizing that a uniform set of federal performance stan-
dards might not be well suited for all states, allowed for the develop-
ment of state programs as long as they were "consistent with"
SMCRA. OSM chose to interpret "consistent with" the act to mean
"consistent with" all rules and regulations issued by OSM. s I Several
critical reviews of proposed state regulations led many state officials
to believe that nothing short of mirroring OSM's regulations would
produce a state program that would satisfy the agency, especially in
light of the fact that OSM developed regulations for design criteria
rather than performance standards. These concerns, according to a
staff analyst in the Library of Congress, "suggest that there is some
legitimacy in this criticism. The States do appear to be left with few
options but to accept all of the Federal regulations as their own in
order to assume regulation of surface mining."' '
These perceptions by state officials that OSM has been intent on
converting state reclamation agencies into federal clones, led to the
passage in September 1979 of the so-called Rockefeller Amendment
in the U.S. Senate.' ' This amendment, which is discussed in detail
later in the article, was aimed at nullifying the rule making authority
of OSM.
Another major concern, especially to western coal states, has been
OSM's interpretation of Section 523(c).5 6 This section partially de-
fines the Secretary of Interior's responsibilities to approve mining
plans on federal lands. OSM has taken this section to mean that all
plans for mines on federal lands must be subject to a federal review
process which essentially duplicates state procedures. For the six
states with prior cooperative agreements with Interior to regulate sur-
face mining on federal lands within their jurisdiction, OSM's interpre-
tation effectively voids such agreements. Another bone of contention
for western reclamation officials is OSM's apparent broad definition
of federal lands jurisdiction. Presumably, under current OSM policy,
if a surface mine on private land has an access road which crosses fed-
eral land, then all mine activities fall under direct OSM regulations.' 7
52. 43 Fed. Reg. 41,662 (1978).
53. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Memo to Senate Commit-
tee on Energy and Natural Resources, Section 503(a)(7) of P.L. 95-87, SMCRA (July 24,
1979).
54. Id.
55. S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S12387 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
56. 30 U.S.C. § 1273(c) (Supp. III 1979).




Perhaps the most significant factor in galvanizing state and industry
counterattacks on OSM's implementation strategy was its generation
of lengthy regulations and detailed permit application and review
procedures. The permanent regulations, published in the Federal
Register on September 18, 1978, were also criticized as inflationary
by the President's Council on Wage and Price Stability." 8 A cost im-
pact analysis of the permanent regulations conducted by Consolida-
tion Coal Company estimated that the "unnecessary costs of comply-
ing with unreasonable, unjustified, and restrictive OSM regulations
would amount to over $1.7 billion to [the company] in the next 11
years." This same study estimated an 11-year cost to the industry
and public of over $34 billion. 9
Various state officials and mine operators have referred to the reg-
ulations as "horrendous," "time consuming," and "unnecessary."
' 6 0
While both the states and the coal industry ostensibly support the
environmental goals of the act, they have been vociferous in their
attacks upon the procedures OSM has adopted to implement them. A
significant point of the debate is that the regulations are a mix of
performance standards and design criteria. That is, for some reclama-
tion and mine operations, the companies must follow specific engi-
neering criteria set forth in the regulations, rather than selecting from
a range of engineering options to meet a performance standard. This
limitation on operator (and, to an extent, state program) discretion
in choosing among a range of options is at the heart of the debate
over the permanent regulations.
Coercive Use of Grants
The final component of OSM's implementation strategy has been
to utilize grants to the states as a tool for influencing the develop-
ment of regulatory programs deemed acceptable to the agency. The
agency's initial position regarding grant allocation was, as one OSM
official put it, to be "blatantly coercive about state use of grants."16 1
This posture is not uncommon for federal agencies that wish to influ-
58. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, PROPOSED SURFACE COAL MINING
AND REGULATION, PERMANENT REGULATORY PROGRAM (1978).
59. 1979 OVERSIGHT HEARINGS, supra note 48, at 150.
60. Interviews with representatives of several Rocky Mountain coal companies, October
29-31, 1979. (At the author's request, representatives' names have been withheld.)
61. Several OSM officials interviewed for this research were given assurances that their
names would not be used.
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ence state or local governmental units. Recently, for example, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency publicly threatened to with-
hold more than $850 million a year from California if the legislature
failed to enact a law mandating inspections of auto emission control
systems. 2
This intergovernmental grantsmanship style, according to the Ad-
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, is simply a re-
flection of a "fanciful" form of federalism, one in which
basic policies in most program areas appear to be made in Washing-
ton either by the Court or the Congress and their implementation is
achieved through decisions, orders, mandates, conditions, regulations
and the lure of federal loot by 12 million state and local civil ser-
vants. And, in the end, the fancy becomes caprice because the sub-
national governments, their elected officials, and bureaucracies are
capable of highly differentiated responses to all this-in terms of
compliance, cooperation, participation, and conflict.6 3
OSM awarded more than $27 million to the states for fiscal year
1978-79 under Section 502(e)(4) of the act. As indicated in Table 2,
there is considerable variation in the distribution of grant funds
among the states; for example, the state of Kentucky has received
sizable sums while other states have received little or nothing. The
mixed success of OSM to utilize grants as a management tool is indi-
cated in a statement by Edward Grandis and L. Thomas Galloway of
the Environmental Law Institute who charge that OSM "capitulated
to Kentucky" on several issues related to the implementation of the
interim regulatory program, that OSM's insistence that Kentucky
meet minimum federal requirements as a condition for a program
met with failure, and consequently, the perception by Kentucky coal
operators that the state had achieved a victory over OSM. 64 Yet, as
Table 1 illustrates, the state of Kentucky was the scene of the great-
est number of inspections, violation notices, and cessation orders in
1979.
STATE STRATEGIES TO LIMIT OSM
The states lost little time reacting to OSM's implementation of the
coal act. The most intense pressures upon OSM came through state
62. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, § A, at 10, col. 3.
63. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE
FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (May 1980 Draft).
64. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON ENERGY & THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE COMM. ON
INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SURFACE MINING





OSM GRANTS TO THE STATESa
Program Development Grants b Interim Program Grantsb
State FY78 FY79 FY78 FY79
Alabama $ 0 $ 0 $ 230 $ 487
Arkansas 0 73 65 152
Colorado 71 264 42 254
Illinois 0 0 398 1,000
Iowa 20 9 45 83
Kansas 0 42 48 95
Kentucky 1,566 864 2,133 5,708
Louisiana 0 103 0 0
Maryland 0 396 159 122
Mississippi 0 116 0 0
Missouri 126 0 46 164
Montana 0 151 58 88
New Mexico 0 150 68 140
North Dakota 463 589 248 199
Ohio 0 0 371 1,500
Oklahoma 205 0 121 468
Pennsylvania 0 0 233 1,053
Tennessee 0 0 26 534
Texas 0 186 196 209
Utah 0 141 62 147
Virginia 286 71 626 786
West Virginia 0 0 882 1,222
Wyoming 289 0 38 483
TOTALS $3,026 $3,155 $6,095 $14,894
aGrants are also made for Small Operators Assistance Programs.
bThousands of dollars.
Source: Office of Surface Mining, U.S. Department of the Interior.
influence in Congress. In congressional oversight hearings, governors
and officials of coal states sharply criticized OSM's apparent over-
extension of its authority to promulgate regulations and implement
them.6 s A primary concern of congressional representatives of coal
states was that OSM paid lip service to the state window concept
while moving toward national uniformity in regulations among states.
This issue was again expressed in a report by the Government Ac-
counting Office, which stated that "many state agencies are con-
vinced that a near verbatim copy of the federal rules as they apply to
65. See 1978 OVERSIGHT HEARINGS, supra note 20.
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performance standards ... will be required to gain Interior's ap-
proval.... 66
In the U.S. Senate, West Virginia's Senators Jennings M. Randolph
and Robert C. Byrd marshalled support for an amendment to nullify
OSM's rulemaking authority. 67 The Rockefeller Amendment, named
after its chief lobbyist, West Virginia's Governor Jay Rockefeller,
passed the Senate on September 11, 1979, by the lopsided vote of
68-26.6 1 The amendment changes the language of the act to require
that state rules and regulations be consistent with the act and not the
regulation issued by OSM.
6 9
Proponents of the amendment argued that OSM had been over-
zealous in writing more than 150 pages of rules and regulations.7
0
Furthermore, it was argued that OSM's rules and regulations were ad-
versely affecting existing state programs and causing energy produc-
tion delays. Some state regulatory authorities further contended that
if the federal program were implemented, it might actually lower en-
vironmental quality in some states because the federal program
would be less stringent than existing state programs. Opponents of
the Rockefeller Amendment, such as Senator Henry M. Jackson of
Washington, argued that the amendment would "create such confu-
sion that enforcement of a national surface mining control program
is likely to be set back for several years as the courts are forced to
substitute their judgment for that of the Congress-on a state-by-state
basis."71
Senator John Melcher of Montana maintained that the Rockefeller
Amendment might impact adversely on energy production by causing
strip mining operations to be delayed by judicial argumentation.7 2
Representative Morris K. Udall of Arizona, whose Committee on In-
terior and Insular Affairs has retained the bill, expressed the view
that the Rockefeller Amendment "has been sold as a tonic for states'
rights, an antidote to federal regulators, and an elixir for our belea-
guered coal industry... [and it is] none of these things."'73
66. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SURROUNDING THE SURFACE
MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT: REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL 13 (1979).
67. S. 1403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S 12350-89 (daily ed. Sept. 11,
1979).
68. Id. at S 12387.
69. Id. at S 12365-83.
70. Koch, Senate Exempts Strip Mining Plans from Rules, 37 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT.
1981 (1979).
71. Id. at 1982.
72. 125 CONG. REC. S12365 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
73. Koch, supra note 70.
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Several efforts have been made by West Virginia members of Con-
gress to dislodge the Rockefeller Amendment from the Udall Com-
mittee. 7 4 However, they have met with very little success. Congress-
man Udall played an instrumental role in the design of P.L. 95-87,
and he is not likely to bow easily to those congressional forces at-
tempting to weaken the federal government's responsibility in this
area. In August, 1980, however, coal state senators led by Senator
Byrd initiated a new effort to circumvent Congressman Udall's power-
ful committee by attaching a new version of S. 1403 to H.R. 1197, a
vessel tonnage bill.7 ' This maneuver was designed to place the re-
fashioned Rockefeller Amendment before a more sympathetic house
committee. Whether or not this parliamentary tactic will succeed re-
mains to be determined, especially in light of the strong opposition
of Congressman Udall, who maintains that the elimination of the fed-
eral regulations would cause massive confusion and unwarranted
delay in implementing the act.7 6
The states have also directed their counterattacks through the fed-
eral courts and have won victories in the judicial arena. In January,
1980, for example, U.S. District Court Judge Glen M. Williams ruled
that P.L. 95-87 is in part unconstitutional and economically burden-
some on the State of Virginia.77 Judge Williams permanently enjoined
from enforcement those sections of the act that deal with the issuance
of cessation orders and civil penalties which, as he interpreted the
facts of the case, deprived mine operators of procedural due process
of the law as guaranteed by the fifth amendment. In Indiana, U.S.
District Court James E. Noland ruled on June 10, 1980, that "various
portions of [the Act] exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce
Clause, impinge upon the sovereign powers of the State of Indiana in
violation of the Tenth Amendment, and contravene due process and
Taking Clause provisions of the Fifth Amendment." '7 8 Judge Noland
enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing numerous pro-
visions of the act, including such requirements that operators make a
convincing commitment toward certain postmining land use, (for ex-
ample, contracts on financial agreements to erect a housing develop-
ment on a stripped mountain top) as a condition for receiving a per-
74. Koch, Senate Votes to Weaken Strip Mining Law, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPT.
2453 (1980).
75. 126 CONG. REC. S 10505 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1980).
76. Letter from Cecil Andrus to Senator John W. Warner, Virginia (August 18, 1980).
77. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.
D. Va.), prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 79-1538).
78. Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452, 456-57 (S.D. Ind.), prob. juris. noted, 101 S.
Ct. 67 (1980) (No. 80-231).
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mit to mine and return the land to its approximate original contour.
These actions, however, have been stayed by the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, pending a full review. 79
Despite these assults on OSM's efforts to implement the coal act,
24 states had submitted regulatory programs for OSM's approval by
the summer of 1980, with approval given to two states-Montana and
Texas. While pressing hard on legal and political fronts, the states
have continued writing their program proposals, rules, and laws won-
dering how much success, if any, they will have in getting OSM to
approve their programs in 1981.
CONCLUSION
The interim regulatory period in the implementation of the coal
act can be characterized as the initial phase of a process whereby new
relationships are being forged between states and the federal govern-
ment in respect to the control of surface mining and reclamation. At
the heart of these new relationships is the issue of who will define the
balance between coal production and environmental quality values.
Many states have, over the years, achieved what their officials con-
sider to be an equilibrium in this balance. The newly formed Office
of Surface Mining, through its effort to establish a set of nationwide
standards, has disturbed this equilibrium and has moved aggressively
into an area where, prior to OSM's existence, the states were the
dominant governmental actors.
As OSM made its presence felt in coal fields and through the
promulgation of its regulations, the conflict between the role that
federal personnel were attempting to establish and the expectations
of state officials became apparent. Based upon the state primacy
clause, state officials anticipated a federal implementation strategy
which, much like the learning system strategy defined by Kirlin,
would be characterized by the provision of financial resources, tech-
nical support, and an enforcement back-up for recalcitrant coal mine
operators. However, OSM officials appear to have been concerned
with the establishment of a dominant federal role from the outset.
The initial strategy, embodying strict enforcement, narrow interpre-
tation of the act, attention to procedure, and coercive utilization of
grants indicates that OSM has attempted to implement an adminis-
trative strategy which stresses procedural compliance with established
rules. This strategy has led to the surfacing of conflicts inherent
within any federal-state regulatory mechanism. These conflicts have




centered around the imposition of tight deadlines for the develop-
ment of state programs, OSM hiring of state agency personnel, differ-
ences in regulatory philosophies and procedures, and, most of all, dif-
ferences in goal or value orientations of state and federal officials.
While the initial implementation strategy of OSM may have con-
tributed in the short run to achieving coal operator compliance
through deterrence, it has detracted from insuring program com-
pliance and cooperation among the states through consensus building
in the long run. Thus, some states desiring OSM approved programs
have submitted plans that to a large extent mirror OSM regulations.
Still, little has been done to resolve the underlying conflicts inherent
in the uniform application of a set of federal standards on a nation-
wide basis. In a procedural sense, OSM has achieved a kind of domi-
nance over the states; but, unless accommodations are made during
the next implementation phase, either the states will find they have
adopted regulations that are hard to live with, or OSM will be faced
with the necessity of maintaining a coercive posture in its oversight
of state regulatory actions at the risk of diminished congressional
support.
The struggle for determining regulatory balance is likely to con-
tinue under the newly installed Reagan administration. Ronald
Reagan has publicly committed his new administration to providing
relief for over-regulated industries, particularly energy related ones.
Moreover, his Secretary of Interior, James G. Watt, while serving as
director of Mountain States Legal Foundation, championed the cause
of federal deregulation of energy production. As a spokesman for the
Sagebrush Rebellion, it is expected that Mr. Watt will, at the very
least, not push for aggressive OSM enforcement. In testimony before
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Watt stated
that while he had "no specific plans" for overhauling SMCRA, fed-
eral surface mining regulation needs improved management which
emphasizes state primacy. Thus, it is expected that Interior will not
implement aggressive OSM action against state interests, and might
even relax its regulations for the utilization of the state window pro-
vision. 8 0
80. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, CONSERVATION REPORT, No. 1, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
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